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In today’s wired and interconnected world, a sheer number of devices are now able to be connected 
to the internet and expose the data generated by user inputs or the devices’ built-in sensors. These 
growing numbers of internet of things (IoT) devices are called smart and they range from mobile 
phones, smart televisions, IP cameras, household and industrial appliances, to Wi-Fi thermostats 
and thermometers. The reason for the avalanche of IoT devices is their convenience and remote 
accessibility over the traditional versions. However, as with other technological breakthroughs, 
IoT have a major issue regarding the security of access and control of the data generated and hence 
privacy.   
To address these issues, we propose in this paper a system based approach:  the system consists of 
two parts to monitor users’ IoTs. The first aspect of this system is a firewall monitoring and 
controlling the incoming and outgoing traffic to and from the IoT devices which are connected to 
the internet via a new generation of routers called Heimdallr. The second aspect is to store locally 
in this router the user’s IoT related data and allow a secure interaction by the user with the data 
and the IoTs. A third concept introduced in the system to ensure that any updates to the IoT 
software is verified and certified by a central not-for-profit organization. Heimdallr would not 
allow any updates to the software to be made unless the update has been certified by this 
certification agency. The certification agency has a role similar to CSA [1] or UL [2] organizations 
which provide testing, inspection and certification service and are involved in setting standards. It 
is worth pointing out that currently in the software domain, all this is done by the for profit 
corporation without any public oversight. The only beacon is the open source community where 
                                                 
1 Heimdallr, in the Norse mythology, is the gods’ watchman having acute hearing and eyesight. 
  
dedicated developers donate their time, talent and energy to produce open source software which 
is often free and the source code is accessible to anyone to investigate and verify their algorithms 
and functions. 
1 Introduction 
Like many of today’s smart devices, an internet of things (IoT) claims to be smart. These smart 
devices replace the function of some traditional device with the ability of not only replacing the 
function, perhaps using other technology, but adding a feature to have a wireless connection (Wi-
Fi). This Wi-Fi feature is needed to connect the device to some transmission device, usually a cell 
phone (another smart device). In the cell phone an ad hoc software program (an app) is used to 
complete the connection of the device to a server which is usually operated and controlled by the 
manufacturer of the IoT device.  This connection is used to transmit data from and to the IoT 
device and provide remote access. The smarts in these devices replace the mental or temporary 
recording of the status of some data: the app and its infrastructure takes over this operation adding 
some convenience to ‘justify’ the higher cost and effort of replacing the old and tried traditional 
device. 
Many issues with IoT devices and networks are being noticed today: this reminds one of the days 
of wild west when entire indigenous communities were wiped out by the advancing hordes of 
immigrant settlers with guns and artillery. Personal privacy is perhaps the most important victim 
of this digital age wild west massacre. The first weakness in IoTs is that their software developed 
is usually rushed by the organization introducing these devices with apparent lack of thought about 
security and privacy. The second issue is the lack of safeguard of the user data which is made 
available, for profit, to third parties. Hence the data subjects (original generators of the data) lose 
control of their data which exposes them to uninvited marketing and manipulation. All small 
incremental data, when aggregated by various players of this digital age gives what we call big 
data. Big data and the governmental laissez-faire attitude  has lead the exploitation  of this data 
and has given rise to mammoth new so called tech companies. One of the most obvious and 
profitable way of exploiting user data, collected and aggregated  from users, is to enable the 
marketing of targeted ads. For instance, the annual advertising revenue of one of these tech giants, 
for the 2018, exceeded 110 billion US dollars forming the major percent of this company’s total 
  
revenues in that year of over 130 billion US dollars [3], [4]. Decades of research in marketing has 
concluded that rather than global publicity, targeted ads are what make the difference. In order to 
gain such data leverage the company keeps track of all the users of their ‘free’ services– along 
with their actions, sites visited, text communications and choices, analyzes them against past usage 
and create profiles which guide their software to choose the most pertinent tailored targeted ads. 
However, they don’t stop there and this is exactly where the problem arises.  
In order to increase profit, these companies with big data sell user profiles to other companies who 
in turn can do the same. For instance Facebook,  allow personal data to be used by paying third 
parties as Mark Zuckerberg revealed during his testimony before the Congress on April 10, 2018. 
During the testimony it was revealed that Aleksandr Kogan, a onetime lecturer at Cambridge 
University, had developed a survey application on Facebook platform and using the access given 
by Facebook, was able to assemble the data of all friends of any user who took the survey. Access 
to the friends data, without the consent of these friends, was a feature of Facebook and any of the 
thousands of applications developed for the platform had access to the users’ and their friends data 
[5], [6]. 
Similar story is heard about other big tech companies as well. Google collects its users’ data and 
sells them to other companies without data owners’ awareness. As Douglas MacMillan stated in 
one of his articles in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ), Google let hundreds of outside developers use 
the data scanned from the in-box of users who have signed up for ‘free’ email-based services [7]. 
Furthermore, according to Google allow these outside developers to share what they collect with 
other third parties. In a letter from Susan Molinari, former vice president for public policy at 
Google, “Developers may share data with third parties so long as they are transparent with the 
users about how they are using the data,” she wrote, according to a WSJ article on September 20, 
2018 [8]. It is not clear what this transparency means and or allows.   
Among all other big companies with billions of users’ personal data, Amazon stands out the most 
when it comes to selling targeted ads, even though, it has only around ten percent of Google or 
Facebook’s big data. Since advertisers value the most accurate information they can get on what 
people actually buy and what they are likely to buy soon, this can be gleaned from the Amazon 
marketing platform. Knowing that, the contents of according to another report from WSJ, even 
  
their employees leak data for cash rewards [9]. It appears that these big tech mammoths are not 
living up to their own privacy policy which they can change without any oversight. 
These reports were only some incidents related to services that users access using an internet 
browser. Now one may start to wonder, how much data we are giving away by just buying IoT 
devices and bringing them into our homes. Amazon Echo and Google Home are such examples. 
Every word that the users say may not be sent to the cloud by those devices, but they are always 
listening to be able to recognize their wake word and this can lead to some serious privacy 
breaches. Furthermore, Amazon Echo and Google Home are legitimate devices made by world 
giants who have so to speak strict privacy policies. But what about the other IoT devices, some are 
start-ups, which are rushed to be made available for profit and lacks safeguards regarding user 
privacy and data security? Do these companies which have access to user profiles have any policies 
or ethical code and how are they regulated? 
Another example of IoT replacing traditional devices is a smart body thermometer. The traditional 
mercury in a glass tube clinical thermometer, was invented in 1724 by Daniel Gabriel Fahrenheit. 
It has been used since [10]. It needs no battery and is ready for use even after years of non-use; the 
only tricky part is to shake down the mercury to reset it. This classical clinical thermometer has 
been replaced by a digital version which requires a battery needing regular replacement.   Both 
these are now being displaced by a smart body temperature thermometer by Kinsa Company which 
is a case in point. These internet-connected thermometers, replacing the traditional mercury 
column in glass versions and even the ordinary digital ones, are now in more than 500,000 
households [11]. These thermometers send the data to an application in a cellphone to track the 
temperature; however, the data is also sent to the device manufacturing company.  During the flu 
season of 2018 the Clorox Company paid to license information from Kinsa, according to NYT 
[12]. Kinsa also sells this data to other companies under the name of Kinsa Insights to be used to 
target advertising [12]. 
This is only one such example of how the users lose control over their personal data and privacy. 
Perhaps, losing control over the private data which consists of the user’s first name, family name 
and email address might not be an issue to some extent, however, if this data gives away 
information about user’s daily routine, this can lead to some serious unwanted consequences. 
Smart thermostats which allow users to see and alter the current temperature of their houses 
  
remotely, carries such data. As an example, if a smart thermostat company provides this user data 
to paying third parties, a misuse of that data could reveal the absence of the house owner at low 
temperatures. Those kind of contemporary issues in the IoT sector show the importance of privacy, 
security and the user having control over their own data. 
2 Proposed System 
Along with the contemporary problems that exist in current in IoT network, there would be other 
serious issues with their proliferation and usage in people’s private lives e.g., IP cameras, baby 
monitors, smart menstrual period trackers etc. An article from BBC says “Although the baby tech 
sector specifically is relatively young and unstudied, researchers from market research firm Hexa 
say the baby-monitoring sub-market alone is projected to grow from $929m in 2016 to $1.63bn 
by 2025” [13]. Therefore, with this dramatic increase, more users will be losing control over their 
data and the increasing loss of privacy would lead to worse consequences.  
To address this problem of such data piracy, we propose, in this paper, a system called Heimdallr 
that builds a fortress around users’ private networks to protect the data generated and used by IoT 
devices and lets the users take control over it. 
Heimdallr is a software that would run on user’s next generation personal wireless smart router: 
itself an IoT! The main idea behind the Heimdallr system is to allow users full control over their 
data by first, monitoring and manipulating the network traffic on the router and secondly, running 
all the necessary services locally (in the router) for users to have access to full features of their 
connected IoT devices without the need of a connection to any server of any of the IoT makers. 
To realize such a complex task, IoT device makers would be required to develop Heimdallr 
compatible user interfaces and services along with their IoT products.  Since Heimdallr is the gate 
keeper, all interaction with any IoT is under its guard, including those coming from mobile phones! 
This obliges us to state the underlying requirements for the system. 
2.1 Requirements 
The proposed solution has to have three main requirements to be fully functional. The most 
essential one is a central non-profit software certification organization; we have named the 
  
Software Assurance Agency or SAA. It is introduced to be responsible for testing, inspecting, 
storing and certifying software from device interfaces and updates to the services provided by IoT 
device makers. The concept intends to prevent two things. Prohibition of software which lacks 
required privacy measures which could threaten users’ private data and monitoring of software 
updates that could alter IoT operations and introduce unwanted features without users’ consent. 
Thus, SAA will guarantee that all software, certified by this organization, does exactly what it is 
supposed to and does not poses any threat to user’s privacy. Put simply, SAA introduces some 
measure of standardization for IoT devices as has been done by organizations such as UL [2] and 
CSA [1]. We envisage that SAA would remain independent and not become a front for IoT 
industry as has been the case with some of the recent  organizations which are directly or indirectly 
the essentially public relations surrogate for the industry [14], [15]. 
The second requirement is to have static IP assigned to our ‘smart’ routers equipped with higher-
end hardware over the routers we use today and including a computing system2. This is required, 
since, Heimdallr is intended to be run on user’s router being the gateway for IoT devices to the 
Internet, and therefore, it must have the minimum system requirements to be able to run the 
Heimdallr software and the required services of the IoT devices as discussed in this paper. 
The final issue that this system has to deal with is the need to be accepted by the tech companies 
worldwide. Under the current circumstances, most of the companies, especially the tech giants, 
would not want the supervision of Heimdallr, given the profit that they are reaping from users’ 
private data. Regarding that, imposing either administrative or social sanctions or both can be 
considered as a possible solution as long as there exist users who are concerned about the privacy 
of their data. In any case, such concerns would create legal, societal and competitive pressure for 
an IoT device maker to support and use the certification authority, SAA. 
                                                 
2 We envisage Heimdallr to be equipped with an economic computing devices such as Raspberry Pi and storage. 
What we are aiming for is the pendulum to swing back and bring back home the user data from the cloud! 
  
2.2 Problems Addressed 
In this section, different types of problems that the Heimdallr system addresses are explained in 
detail. 
2.2.1 Supply Company related issues 
As  discussed in the introduction, recent experience with manipulating user data for political gain 
amply illustrates that unregulated tech companies are not necessarily the organizations that should 
be trusted with user data privacy and security [16], [17]. Although not every company is selling 
user data for profit, non-the-less many of them still have other problems. Third-party services are 
one of the most common examples of this issue. Many small and big IoT companies use third-
party services in their products to provide additional features to users without their consent. A 
study on IoT devices shows along with many other examples that “During the first minute after 
power-on, the Samsung Smart TV talks to Google Play, Double Click, Netflix, FandangoNOW, 
Spotify, CBS, MSNBC, NFL, Deezer, and Facebook—even though we did not sign in or create 
accounts with any of them” [18]. The same study says, “The Geeni smart bulb communicates with 
gw.tuyaus.com, which is operated by TuYa, a China-based company and also offers an MQTT 
service, which allows the manufacturer to communicate with their device in a user’s home; 
apparently done without the knowledge or permission of the user” [18]. Therefore, not only users 
have lost the control over their data, there is no guarantee that these third-party services will not 
do anything harmful with it. For all these reasons, Heimdallr system requires all IoT device makers 
to develop Heimdallr compatible user interface and services that will run locally. This would 
produce two desirable results. First, none of the IoT devices will be required to use any known or 
unknown services on the Internet, which means that user data will flow only between the user and 
the IoT device via Heimdallr and go nowhere else,; second, all data that the IoT devices consume 
can be monitored, changed, collected and deleted by the user with the intermediary Heimdallr. As 
a conclusion, there will be no reason to have unwanted data leaks since users have the full control 
over their data. 
Another problem with keeping hundreds of thousands of user profiles in company databases is that 
it basically creates a bigger risk of data theft. People do not just use one service or a single IoT 
device, but they use products of dozens of different companies. Even with a single product, a user’s 
data gets stored in the device maker’s database, as well as databases of all third-party services that 
  
this product works with. Therefore, in a real life case where a single user owns several products, 
duplication and storage of their private data in a number of locations increases gradually. This 
raises the threat to data privacy, since, the same user’s data is stored in an unknown number of 
different databases with different security measures and vulnerabilities. While, one company might 
be able protect users’ data in a difficult situation, another one could fail to do so under the exact 
same circumstances. Similarly, an article posted on Electronic Privacy Information Center’s 
website says, “In another sense, control can be lost as more and more companies collect data about 
users. This data often paints a detailed picture of individual users through the collection of 
activities online” [19]. This indicates that keeping the personal data securely, in one place is 
definitely a step that must be taken on the way to secure it. With Heimdallr user data will only be 
stored locally in Heimdallr’s database. Thus, one can be sure that the data is secure as long as the 
Heimdallr is. Additionally, since every user will have an independent Heimdallr system, there will 
be less private data stored in any database. Therefore, as Apple CEO Tim Cook says, “No one 
should have a key that turns a billion locks. It shouldn’t exist. No one should have the message 
content for all of these messages. You wouldn’t want it all in one place. I think it would be very 
bad for security and privacy” [20] in an interview with TIME’s Nancy Gibbs, when the effort 
needed to penetrate billions of Heimdallr systems is compared to its reward, it becomes less 
attractive for intruders who are seeking to violate others privacy.  
2.2.2 Hardware/Software related issues 
IoT related problems do not always stem from companies’ privacy policies. They sometimes arise 
from rushed or imperfect software development which lacks essential security measures. Non-
technical or even the technical users may not be able to notice a defect in a software which leads 
to serious violation of data privacy. Given the fact that those programs are embedded and working 
in IoT devices, it becomes nearly impossible for any user to analyze them. Additionally, “Most 
IoT devices do not mention the specific third parties they communicate with in their privacy 
policies, which makes it difficult for consumers to make purchasing decisions based on security 
and privacy considerations” says the study mentioned earlier [18]. Introduction of SAA plays an 
essential role here. Trustfulness of the software used in IoT devices is guaranteed for maximum 
safety of personal data and privacy by a not-for-profit open organization. 
  
Every IoT device consists of both software and hardware, and therefore, both aspects have to be 
considered for probable vulnerabilities. An article from Malmö University that supports this idea 
says, “Appliance manufacturers don’t always think like established software developers do in 
terms of, for instance, security and quality criteria in the development phase. Quite the contrary, 
actually. And the embedded systems in the Internet of things, are often developed by using existing 
chips and designs, and the quality or security criteria in their development process there are 
unknown” [21]. For that matter, while SAA is offering a solution to software defects, Heimdallr 
will be protecting the integrity of user data against any kind of hardware exploits to prevent 
unwanted breaches. Heimdallr achieves this by monitoring and controlling the incoming and 
outgoing data traffic to and from the IoT devices in the network. It will allow only the requests 
from IP addresses which are either whitelisted or not blacklisted with valid cookies, while blocking 
all the other data flow to and from any device. Heimdallr also provides its users secure access to 
IoT devices connected to it by building a firewall which checks user credentials and user’s current 
location. Thus, even if there are any hardware issues that pose a risk to user privacy, without the 
permission of the actual user, the integrity of private data will be ensured. 
Enforcing generalized security measures can be pretty difficult when it comes to IoTs. One of the 
techniques used is to create a generalized protection mechanism and if it works on the test system, 
it is assumed to work on all similar systems. It is assumed that his principal would work for IoTs; 
however, since IoTs borrow heavily from existing technologies and have to be used in differing 
environments the adaption is not straight forward.  Thought about security and privacy are not 
paramount in the design and implementation of the core components, of both hardware and 
software of IoTs [21]. Instead of per device protection, Heimdallr offers a generalized solution by 
creating a safe zone for all IoT devices in its network as it is mentioned above. 
A final software related issue worth mentioning is the complex nature of the security procedures 
involved in the server connections established between the user, IoT device and the server that 
provides the necessary services. Instead of depending on unknown procedures, and protocol for 
security and privacy of each type of IoTs, it is preferable to come up with an open standard and its 
implementation to avoid denial of service or privacy breaches [22]. Thus, Heimdallr provides the 
necessary protocols and services to its established users securely. That means, instead of thousands 
of clients trying to access the same service on a server for a given IoT device, only a limited 
  
number of authenticated users would have regular access to the IoTs. Direction of the authenticated 
users’ request into their dedicated Heimdallr system by-passes the IoT makers’ server. The only 
load on the server would be requests to the SAA for registering updates to firmware and creating 
certificate for these updates. Heimdallr would make periodic requests for updates to the SAA.  
This solution that Heimdallr provides solves another serious contemporary issue with IoT devices, 
namely Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. In August 2016, a botnet called Mirai was 
first identified by the whitehat security group MalwareMustDie. Right after, in September 2016, 
according to Kolias et al [23]. Website of Brian Krebs, a computer security consultant, was hit 
with 620 Gbps of traffic. The principle behind Mirai botnet is to first scan random public IP 
addresses through the telnet protocol (TCP port 23 or 2323) and try to log in to any IoT device 
discovered using just 62 possible default username-password pairs. Once the access is gained, 
Mirai gets control of that device to be used for further DDoS attacks. However, Heimdallr natively 
prevents this thanks to its firewall. In order for a request to reach an IoT device in the Heimdallr 
network, the requester has to first successfully enter the user-defined credentials, and secondly, 
the origin of the request must be white listed by the user. If a malware like Mirai botnet try to 
intrude on an IoT device connected to Heimdallr, it would cut the connection immediately with 
that origin and blacklist it. Furthermore, if an IoT device gets infected by such a malware, a DDoS 
attack cannot be launched with that device, since, Heimdallr would not allow any data to pass 
through unless the target IP is whitelisted or the HTTPS packet that is sent carries a valid cookie. 
3 Architecture of Heimdallr 
Implementation of the Heimdallr system, while intuitively simple, requires complex acceptance 
issues which are beyond the realm of a technical paper. Aside from its exigent requirements for 
this idea to work, the intended features for Heimdallr needs a team of dedicated developers, funds, 
and most importantly time. However, to validate our concept, we have implemented a dry-run-test 
version of the proposed system to be tested and evaluated to see its competency. In this section, 
we provide high level design of the Heimdallr system which was used for our proof of concept. 
  
3.1 System Diagrams 
In order to see how the final product may look and function, we implemented the essential 
components of a real life scenario of an IoT device usage supported by the Heimdallr system. Note 
that the diagrams shown below represent not the actual implementation of the proposed solution 
but a proof-of-concept version of the devices which have a role in such a scenario. This includes 
the implementation of a Client Device, an IoT Device, Heimdallr, IoT Device Maker, and SAA. 
Figure 1 gives the Deployment diagram of the proposed system; Figure 2 gives a Use Case and 
Figure 3 depicts the Sequence diagrams of our proof-of-concept system. 
3.1.1 Deployment Diagram 
 
Figure 1: Deployment Diagram of the proposed system 
This figure shows the relationship between hardware and software components of the 
complete system 
 
In the Deployment diagram above, the overall system design and the relationship between all the 
involved hardware and software components are indicated. The system is composed of mainly five 
hardware components plus a database for SAA. Those are Client Device, IoT Device, IoT Device 
  
Maker, user home smart Router, and finally SAA. A client device is what enables users’ to connect 
to their Heimdallr installed router. It hosts the key generator software that generates access codes 
for first time logins on new devices and another client-side software such as a web browser or an 
application with a UI to interact with their Heimdallr. An IoT device is an internet connected 
device like a smart thermostat which is to be controlled by the client device in our tests via 
Heimdallr. It consists of a single program which allows the device to connect to Heimdallr through 
its TCP socket and processes every task –in its controller– sent by the client device to Heimdallr 
and then redirected to it.  
IoT device makers, instead of accessing their IoTs directly would simply change their procedures; 
the change requires them to register their product with the SAA and upload all initialization and 
update codes to the SAA along with all necessary documentation changes implemented and the 
reason for the changes. The documentation must be public and open and accessible from the device 
maker or SAA.  SAA is the main source for all software and their certification; all software for all 
SAA registered IoTs is accessible from it.  
Once any software from IoT device maker initiates a certification process with the SAA and if the 
certification process is successful, the software is ready for distribution; if not the IoT maker is 
notified and the software is in a hold status until a satisfactory update is made for, and a new 
request for certification.  A certified software is passed on to the Data Access Object (DAO – the 
software repository) of the SAA and required details are stored in the SAA’s database. SAA is also 
connected to Heimdallr through its TCP socket and responsible for delivering the requested 
software (product) or update to Heimdallr when needed.  
The final component shown in Figure 1 is the Heimdallr router. Here the router is the high-end 
hardware running the Heimdallr software and a database connected to that. There are seven main 
components that we can classify in Heimdallr. TCP Socket, Websocket, DAO/Repository, 
Controller, Key Generator, Webapp, and Resources. TCP socket allows it to connect to the other 
elements, particularly to the IoT device and SAA. Web socket along with web app component 
provide a real-time UI –stored in resources– to the client device. DAO (repository) is responsible 
for database related operations such as checking the user credentials or adding a new IP address to 
the white-list. Controller is the heart of the Heimdallr where every request made to it is processed. 
  
It redirects users to correct pages, manages all the security related tasks, and passes all required 
information to and from the client device and the IoT device. 
3.1.2 Use Case Diagram 
 
Figure 2: Heimdallr Use Case Diagram 
This figure shows the interaction of an IoT user with the Heimdallr system 
 
In the Use Case diagram above the interaction of a user with Heimdallr and the possible actions 
are shown. A user can control an IoT device by means of seeing and altering its current status. 
User also can see all of the owned connected IoT devices, change currently assigned role (user or 
admin), change username and password, add or remove IP addresses and whitelist or blacklist 
them, sign out from a client device (e.g. a web browser) by invalidating its cookie, connect new or 
remove registered IoT devices, login and finally logout. In the diagram above, it is shown that 
every action requires the user to first connect to the Heimdallr and then login before taking any 
other actions. Login action can lead to another action called bad credentials where the user is 
prompted to re-enter the correct username-password pair or an access code generated with the key 
generator. 
  
3.1.3 Sequence Diagram 
 
Figure 3: Sequence Diagram of the proposed solution 
This figure shows the interactions of the components (elements) sequentially for a given 
time period   
 
In the Sequence diagram given in Figure 3 the interactions of the actors (elements) of the system 
are shown in a timeline. From left to right the actors are aligned and the period of time starts at the 
top and ends at the bottom. Thus, the very first action is taken by the IoT Device Maker by 
developing and releasing the product for an IoT device. Then, SAA receives and checks it and if it 
decides that the product has no security flaws, certifies and stores it. Meanwhile, an IoT Device 
requests registration to Heimdallr and Heimdallr checks if any service or update is available to 
download for that device in SAA database. Right after the registration of the IoT Device is 
completed an IoT User requests login to Heimdallr. If user credentials are correct, the cookie sent 
in the https packet is valid and the IP address of the requester is not blacklisted Heimdallr grants 
the access. After that, user can take any action given in Figure 2. 
  
3.2 Preliminary Experimentations 
With a working proof-of-concept simulator of Heimdallr system, we first checked the integrity of 
the system to make sure that there were no flaws within the basic functionality. Every use case is 
tested with a single user and single IoT device, single user and multiple IoT devices, multiple users 
and single IoT device, and multiple users and multiple IoT devices using different IP addresses. 
Since one part of the Heimdallr is a web application, the system must be robust enough to be able 
to negate every kind of known web attack for absolute security. For now, during our tests only the 
most common attacks on web services are simulated namely Cross-site Scripting (XSS), SQL 
Injection, and Cross-site Request Forgery. We plan to do further experimentation for other types 
of potential vulnerabilities. Hence in the next part in the development work, all known attacks will 
be tested and any vulnerabilities found would be addressed. We also make sure that Hypertext 
Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) is the only protocol to communicate with Heimdallr to increase 
security. Finally, we tested the consistency of our Key Generator algorithm to make sure that two-
factor authentication works flawlessly when a request is made from a new IP address and doesn’t 
carry a valid cookie. 
During our tests, we noticed that an essential feature was posing a security risk. We were using 
MAC addresses when registering an IoT device to Heimdallr. However, an attacker can eavesdrop 
on the packets that is sent from a wirelessly connected IoT device and through MAC spoofing, an 
unknown IoT device can impersonate that registered device and gain access to Heimdallr. Since, 
one has to physically access a device to get its serial number, we decided to use it and the device’s 
name when registering to prevent MAC spoofing and related attacks. 
Overall the current version of the Heimdallr system works as intended with all the basic 
functionality after all of the tests on which we ran in local network. However, even though the idea 
of this system showed its competency to deal with the current IoT related issues in our tests, we 
concluded that for more accurate results, an alpha prototype should be implemented and tested in 
a typical real usage replication with a mix of simulated smart IoTs.                                      
  
4 Conclusions and Future Work 
IoT devices are proliferating and becoming every day tools for the ordinary person. The ubiquity 
of these devices allows us to see them even in the private moments of our lives. The access of the 
data that we provide to IoT device makers –by using these devices, exposes our habits, routine and 
schedule in addition to the base data given up in good faith. Thus, all the security issues related to 
data exposed to the IoT device suppliers and the third parties they use and the vulnerabilities hidden 
in the IoT devices’ hardware and software is becoming a more serious threat to privacy. As a result 
of our study of those issues we realize that as long as an IoT device is able to access the internet 
freely, privacy of the user data is compromised. For this reason we created the Heimdallr system. 
Heimdallr can be described as a guardian that enhances the function of the users’ home routers. It 
monitors and controls the incoming and outgoing data traffic to and from the IoT devices 
connected to it and only allows requests from authorized users from whitelisted IP addresses and/or 
having secure credentials including a valid cookie. Additionally, it is able to connect to SAA for 
access to all certified software and its updates for an IoT device. The system thus guarantees that 
the users’ private data flows only between the IoT device and the user. 
Our plan is the implementation of an alpha version of this system. Since all data passes through 
the Heimdallr, it can collect all data and updates for later reference while having all of it under 
the control and possession of the owner of the system [24].  
 
We see our system as the start of the swing of the pendulum to the era were the data subject did 
not need outside for-profit data storage service(cloud) and would lead to other development to 
re-create privacy preserving version of what is being offered by today's big tech companies. With 
judicial user interface, operation of Heimdallr would be made as easy as some of the better 
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